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THE EFFECTS OF COUNTEREXPLANATION AND AUDIT GROUPS 
ON FRAUD DETECTION 
Abstract 
Prior studies have found that auditors' fraud detection rates are relatively low (Bernardi 1994; 
Pincus 1991 ). The present study examines whether counterexplaining inaccurate judgments 
will increase fraud detection rates and whether audit groups can counterexplain more 
effectively compared to individual auditors. The possible negative effect of 
counterexplanation is examined by requiring audit groups and individual auditors to 
counterexplain accurate judgments. The purpose of this 'inanipulatiori is to determine whether 
counterexplaining accurate judgments will lead to negative belief revision, and whether this 
negative belief revision will be mitigated by the use of audit groups. A 2 x 2 x 2 experiment 
which examined groups/individuals, initial judgment and explanation/counterexplanation was 
carried out. The results support the hypotheses that counterexplaining inaccurate judgments 
leads to more accurate judgments and counterexplaining accurate judgments leads to less 
accurate judgments. The finding on whether audit groups could counterexplain more 
effectively than individual auditors requires further explanation. 
Key words: Explanations, causal explanations, belief revision, fraud detection, inventory 
audit. 
THE EFFECTS OF COUNTEREXPLANATION AND AUDIT GROUPS 
ON FRAUD DETECTION 
INTRODUCTION 
An auditor's ability to detect fraud is generally low (Bernardi 1994; Pincus 1991; 
1990). Such failure may be attributed to many factors, and prior auditing research has 
attempted to identify some of these. Bernardi (1994), Johnson et al. (1993), Reckers and 
Schultz (1993), and Pincus (1991; 1990) examined the effects of personality differences on 
fraud detection rates. While explaining auditor behavior is valid and important, audit 
judgment research should also discover means of correcting sub-optimal auditor behavior. 
There is evidence in the auditing literature of the beginnings .of such. a trend (e.g., Reckers 
and Schultz [1993] examined group-assisted judgment, and Kennedy [1993; 1995], Koonce 
[ 1992] and Heiman [ 1990] examined counterexplanation). 
Prior auditing literature suggests that counterexplanation may result in more effective 
judgments. 1 This study considers whether the provision of a counterexplanation improves 
fraud detection. In counterexplaining, the decision maker is required to consider why his/her 
chosen judgment alternative may be incorrect and/or why the rejected alternative(s) may be 
correct (Koriat et al. 1980). Prior studies required auditors to counterexplain experimenter-
prescribed hypothesis (e.g., Koonce 1992; Kennedy 1995) whereas another treatment of this 
technique in the psychology literature (e.g., Koriat et al. 1980) required participants to 
counterexplain their own hypotheses.2 Decision makers' commitment to an experimenter-
prescribed hypothesis may not be at the same level as their commitment to their own 
hypothesis. In addition, decision makers often generate their own hypothesis. Therefore, using 
Koriat et al.' s treatment of explanation/counterexplanation, this study provides evidence on 
counterexplaining by audit groups and individual auditors that serves two purposes. 
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First, there is evidence in the literature of the increasing use of counterexplanation in 
practice. For example, Libby and Trotman (1993) found that audit reviewers pay greater 
attention to evidence inconsistent with the conclusions reached by their audit subordinates in 
analytical procedures. Before this practice of counterexplanation becomes widespread, there 
is a need to investigate whether there is(are) any negative effect(s) of counterexplanation. 
That is, the effectiveness of counterexplanation as a debiasing technique should be more 
rigorously tested. Researchers should question whether there are conditions where requiring 
an auditor to counterexplain would be counter-productive. In addition to examining the 
positive aspects of counterexplanation, this study also examines the potential negative 
effect(s) of counterexplanation. 
Sec.end, if there are potential negative effects of_ counterexplanation, the present study 
examines these effects on audit groups. The motivation for this is two-fold. First, we consider 
whether audit groups will enhance the positive aspects of counterexplanation and lead to 
higher fraud detection rates. Second, we consider whether the negative aspects of 
counterexplanation may be mitigated through the use of audit groups. Prior studies reported 
that the use of groups may lead to improved judgments. For example, groups were able to 
moderate extreme views (Fisher and Ellis 1990), and group-assisted judgments led to higher 
compliance with professional pronouncements (Reckers and Schultz 1993). 
This study uses a modified version of the case materials used by Pincus ( 1991 ), which 
contained material management fraud. Both individual auditors and groups of auditors 
evaluated the case materials and made a judgment on whether an inventory balance was fairly 
presented. After making the judgment, half of the participants provided an explanation for 
their initial judgment, while the other half provided a counterexplanation. They then made a 
final judgment on the fair presentation of the inventory balance. The results showed that 
while counterexplaining inaccurate judgments led to more accurate judgments, 
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counterexplaining accurate judgments resulted in lower accuracy. We found weak evidence to 
suggest that audit groups may enhance the positive effects of counterexplanation and no 
evidence to support our hypothesis that audit groups mitigate the negative effects of 
counterexplanation. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Counterexplanation 
Decision makers are often required to explain their judgment by providing reasons 
that speak for or provide support for the chosen alternative, or reasons that point against the 
alternative rejected. Several theories explain why explaining .one's own. judgment would not 
improve accuracy. First, providing an explanation increases the availability of causal relations 
between the information and the explained event, and leads to an explanation effect3 (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973). Second, the simulation heuristic suggests that decision makers build a 
series of steps which connects the information (evidence) to the judgment. This cognitive 
heuristic is premised on the assumption that "downhill events" (events that are easier to 
construct) are considered more likely to occur than "uphill events" (events that are less easy 
to construct) (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Consequently, more "downhill events" are 
constructed compared to "uphill events" and an explanation effect is observed. 
Third, decision makers selectively review the information available and encode only 
those cues which are consistent with the outcome explained (Sherman et al. 1983). Snyder 
and his associates (Snyder and Campbell 1980; Snyder and Cantor 1970; Snyder and Swann 
1978) found that decision makers generally prefer information that confirms their impressions 
or hypotheses rather than information that disconfirms them. Consequently, they selectively 
review the data set for confirming information and ignore disconfirrning information. This 
increases the availability of confirming information to decision makers and results in an 
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explanation effect. Fourth, the explanation effect may also be explained by what Hoch (1984) 
referred to as "interference". When a decision maker generates a set of reasons for (against) 
the occurrence of an event, this act interferes with his/her ability to generate reasons against 
(for) the occurrence of the event. The alternative explained first becomes encoded in long-
term memory, whereas the encoding in long-term memory of the latter-explained alternative 
may be less prominent. Consequently, the alternative initially explained becomes more 
readily available to the decision maker and influences his/her likelihood judgments. 
Counterexplanation is the provision of reasons that either speak against or provide 
evidence against the chosen alternative, or speak for or point towards the alternative(s) 
rejected (Koriat et al. 1980). While it is seldom required in decision making, research in the 
social psychology literature reports that counterexplanation could lead to more effective 
judgments. For example, in a general knowledge task, Koriat et al. (1980) used 
counterexplanation with some success in correcting over-confidence in their student 
participants. This was possible because over-confidence is partly due to decision makers' 
tendency to ignore disconfirming information (Koriat et al. 1980). Hoch ( 1985) also found 
over-confidence with his student participants and, like Koriat et al., showed that such over-
confidence could be mitigated by the use of counterexplanation. Counterexplanation has also 
been shown to be effective in debiasing belief perseverance4 (Anderson 1982) and in 
correcting the explanation bias (Anderson and Sechler 1986). This is because explanation 
bias is partly due to the neglect of alternative theories One way of reducing the effect of 
causal explanations is to increase the availability of opposing arguments. Anderson and 
Sechler ( 1986) and Anderson ( 1982) suggested that the technique used to debias belief 
perseverance, i.e., counterexplanation, may be effective in regulating the formation of causal 
explanations5 at both the individual and group level. As these studies involved the application 
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of counterexplanation in general knowledge tasks, the real test for counterexplanation as a 
debiasing technique is in domain-specific tasks. 
While auditing studies are limited, the initial results from the use of 
counterexplanation among auditors appear encouraging ( e.g., Heiman 1990; Koonce 1992; 
Kennedy 1995). The experimental treatment of counterexplanation in these studies required 
auditor participants to counterexplain experimenter-prescribed hypothesis. For example, 
Heiman ( 1990) required auditor participants to counterexplain an experimenter-prescribed 
hypothesis and showed that it caused auditors to revise their likelihood judgments. Her study 
also showed that auditors' likelihood judgments were affected by the number of 
counterexplanations considered. Koonce (1992) found that .counterexplanation was effective 
in reducing the explanation effect, but only in the group of participants that explained before 
counterexplaining. Her participants also explained and/or counterexplained a hypothesis 
provided by the experimenter. Kennedy (1995) required participants to focus their concern on 
counterexplaining an experimenter-prescribed outcome prior to making predictions about 
other participants' estimate of the outcome, and predicted that this manipulation would 
weaken the tendency to construct causal explanations. Her findings were inconclusive. 
While these studies made use of experimenter-prescribed hypotheses, in practice, 
auditors often generate their own hypotheses. Consequently, this study requires participants to 
provide the direction of their explanation/counterexplanation by making an initial judgment 
prior to explaining/counterexplaining. This treatment facilitates the examination of any 
change(s) participants may make to their initial likelihood judgment after explaining or 
counterexplaining. These changes are referred to as belief revision. Consistent with Koriat et 
al. ( 1980) and Hoch ( 1985), participants were not required to explain prior counterexplaining 
as they would have explained as a natural part of the judgment process. Counterexplanation 
makes opposing arguments more salient to the auditor, so that those who counterexplain 
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would re-examine the data set for opposing arguments that may have been overlooked or 
discounted as unimportant during the initial evaluation of the data set. As a consequence, they 
will revise their inaccurate judgment for a more accurate one. That is, they will make positive 
belief revision. 
Revising a judgment after providing a counterexplanation is only desirable when the 
switch is from inaccurate judgments to more accurate ones. Auditors who have made accurate 
judgments should not make negative revisions regardless of whether they are required to 
explain or counterexplain. At the time of requiring a counterexplanation, the audit superior 
cannot tell whether a certain audit subordinate's judgment is accurate. It is precisely for the 
purpose of soliciting more effective judgmentS''· in-· an "·uncertain environment that 
counterexplanation is required. So it is possible that both accurate and inaccurate auditors 
may be required to counterexplain. 
Besides causing auditors to process opposing arguments, counterexplanation also 
affects auditors' confidence. Koriat et al. ( 1980) and Hoch ( 1985) demonstrated that 
counterexplanation resulted in reduced confidence. Used among auditors, it could produce 
such uncertainty that counter-productive belief revisions result, i.e., when accurate judgments 
are substituted for less accurate ones. The uncertainty resulting from counterexplaining may 
cause negative belief revisions, so that accurate auditors who counterexplain will become less 
accurate. That is, they will revise their accurate judgment because the opposing arguments 
they process cause them to lose confidence in their initial judgment. Consequently, they will 
revise their judgment in the direction of the opposing arguments and thus become less 
accurate. Those who explain accurate judgments are not exposed to opposing arguments and 
will not become less accurate. Because of this, auditors who counterexplain accurate 
judgments will make more negative belief revision compared to auditors who explain 
accurate judgments. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hi Explaining and counterexplaining accurate and inaccurate judgments will have an 
effect on belief revision so that: 
a) auditors who counterexplain an inaccurate judgment will make more positive 
belief revision compared to auditors who explain an inaccurate judgment, and 
b) auditors who counterexplain an accurate judgment will make more negative 
belief revision compared to auditors who explain an accurate judgment. 
Audit Groups 
Prior literature reports that groups outperform individuals in three ways. First, groups 
are able to recall more information because this task is shared among group members. As 
group members may potentially recall different information items, the group discussion is 
enriched (Stasser 1992). Second, due to their corporate efforts, groups are able to process 
more information than individuals (Stocks and Harrell 1995; Chalos and Pickard 1985). They 
are able to select and weight cues more effectively than individuals (Stocks and Harrell 1995; 
Chalos and Pickard 1985). Third, groups have a larger information base to support their 
judgments. This occurs when group members pool their individual store of information and 
their processing of information cues and integrate these cues into a solution (Stasser 1988; 
Stasser and Titus 1985). Arising from the reasons discussed above, groups are expected to 
counterexplain more effectively than individual auditors. When required to counterexplain an 
inaccurate judgment, audit groups would make larger positive belief revision than individual 
auditors would. Their corporate processing efforts allow them to discover discrepancies and 
inconsistencies, and possibly, the fraud, in the data set. Individual auditors, working alone, 
may overlook these misstatements because they do not have the benefit of groups' corporate 
processing capacity. 
Counterexplaining an accurate judgment would have a more negative effect on 
individual auditors than on audit groups, i.e., when required to counterexplain an accurate 
judgment, audit groups should make smaller negative belief revision than individual auditors. 
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As individual auditors have lower processing capacity compared to audit groups, they may 
have missed opposing arguments when they make their initial judgment. When required to 
counterexplain, they would process these opposing arguments for the first time, and the 
uncertainty created by these opposing arguments causes them to make belief revision in 
direction of the opposing arguments. When groups are required to counterexplain an accurate 
judgment, this forces them to go through the data set again. Unlike the individual auditors, the 
accurategroups are likely to have considered opposing arguments when they made their initial 
judgment as it is unlikely that all group members will have the same initial hypothesis. In 
addition, opposing arguments would not cause the same uncertainty expected among 
individual auditors as groups tend to be more confident than individuals are (Sniezek and 
Henry 1990; 1989). Consequently, an interaction effect between audit groups/individual 
auditors, initial judgment and type of explanation on belief revision is expected. Audit groups 
are expected to mitigate the negative effects of counterexplaining an accurate judgment more 
than individual auditors are. Audit groups will also enhance the positive effects of 
counterexplaining an inaccurate judgment more than individual auditors will. The interaction 
effect hypothesis is stated as: 
H2 Audit groups will rrut1gate the negative effects of counterexplaining an accurate 
judgment and enhance the positive effects of counterexplaining an inaccurate 
judgment more than individual auditors will. 
THE EXPERIMENT 
Task 
The inventory audit task used was a modified version of the task used by Pincus 
(1991 ). This task, which was based on an actual audit client in the restaurant business, 
contained a material misstatement of the inventory balance by management. The case 
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provided information on the background of the company as well as the current and prior 
years' inventory and other financial data. The information provided included both positive 
and negative indicators of the fair presentation of the inventory balance so the judgment was 
not clear cut. The results of the current year's audit procedures for inventory were also 
available together with selected client records. Management committed the fraud by 
overstating ending inventory quantities and values. This could be detected via the various risk 
indicators such as excessive ending inventory, inventory count procedures, management 
control, over-ride of internal control procedures by management, and inconsistent opening 
and closing inventory amounts for the year being audited. 
Forty-eight information items out of the original 70 were -used and only the 
information for the latest three years were given.6 A summary of these 48 information items is 
listed in Appendix A. The final version of the case was examined by two experts in the 
hospitality and restaurant industry for realism. Both experts were of the opinion that the case 
was realistic and reflective of current restaurant practice. Even though the case had been 
simplified, it still contained sufficient information to successfully test the variables 
manipulated in this study. 
Participants 
Participants were 271 accountants attending a national training program that prepared 
them for the Institute of Chartered Accountants' Professional Year examinations in auditing. 
At the time of the experiment, all the participants had at least one year working experience. 
They had also completed five days of audit training. Their average age was 24 years (sd 2.4 
years) and their average working experience was 34 months (sd 27 months). Sixty-one 
percent of participants had audit experience and these ranged from one to 72 months. The 
average audit experience of all participants was 11.25 months ( 12.8 months). The average 
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number of inventory audits performed was three. The participants were paid A$20 each for 
their efforts.7 
Procedures 
The experiment was carried out during one of the training sessions. The 2 x 2 x 2 full 
factorial experiment tested explanation/counterexplanation, initial judgment and audit 
groups/individual auditors. Table 1 shows the experiment design. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
All the participants received the case materials in a booklet. The front of the booklet 
provided introductory information which explairted the purpose of the experiment and 
provided an assurance of confidentiality. In the group condition, participants were formed 
into groups of three at the start of the experiment. For both the group and individual 
conditions, participants were asked to spend 15 minutes familarizing themselves with the case 
materials. They read the initial information of the case materials which contained a general 
description of the operations of a chain of fast-food restaurants. The instructions to all 
participants read: 
Instructions 
In order for you to perform an audit of Tucker House's inventory balance, the 
following information items are available. You should only evaluate those 
information items you consider are necessary for forming an opinion on whether 
or not the inventory balance is fairly stated. 
Following these instructions were the content pages showing the types of information 
available, followed by 48 information items. After acquainting themselves with the 
information for about 15 minutes, participants in the group condition were instructed to 
assume that they had been assigned as a member of an audit group for the audit of the 
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inventory balance of a client. A large envelope was provided and the participants were 
required to insert each completed task into the envelope before proceeding to the next task. A 
message on the envelope stated "Do not remove materials that have been inserted into the 
envelope". Individual auditors received the same instructions except they worked alone. 
The first task required participants in the group condiditon to discuss and work on the 
case as a group to arrive at a consensus on whether or not the inventory balance is fairly 
presented. They recorded their consensus judgment on two scales - a dichotomous scale 
comprising "fairly presented" and "not fairly presented" and a nine-point Likert-type scale 
anchored by "fairly presented" ( 1) and "not fairly presented" (9). In addition, they also 
recorded their confidence on a IO 1-point scale anchored by, !'not at. all confident" (0) and 
"very confident" ( 100). The procedures for individual auditors were similar except they 
performed the tasks on their own and recorded their individual judgment. In the second task, 
explanation type was manipulated. Half of the participants in the group and individual 
conditions were assigned to the explanation condition while the other half were assigned to 
the counterexplanation condition. Participants in the explanation condition were required to 
consider the reasons why their answer in task one may be correct and/or why the altemative(s) 
they rejected, may be incorrect. Participants in the counterexplanation condition considered 
the reasons why their answer in task one may be incorrect and/or why the alternative they 
rejected, may be correct. Participants in both conditions then recorded their reasons in the 
space provided as part of task three. Participants in the group condition performed these tasks 
as a group while those in the individual condition worked alone. 
In task four, the participants were required to make a final judgment on whether or not 
the inventory was fairly presented using both the dichotomous and the nine-point scales. The 
groups recorded a consensus group judgment whereas the individual recorded their individual 
judgment. They also recorded their confidence on a scale similar to the one described above. 
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In the post-test questionnaire, the participants provided various demographic as well as some 
diagnostic information8. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the ANCOV A results. The model tests the interaction effects between 
explanation/counterexplanation, groups/individuals and initial judgment. Because the 
explanation/counterexplanation and the groups/individuals variables were categorical, initial 
judgment was dichotomized at the mid-point to yield two groups - inaccurate and accurate 
auditors.9•10 As the participants had varying levels of audit experience, the ANCOVA analysis 
included audit experience as a covariate. Table 2 shows that·audit experience did not have a 
significant . effect on belief revision (F < 1, p > .1 )_. Also included as a covariate was 
confidence revision. Confidence revision refers to the difference in confidence associated 
with the initial judgment and confidence related to the final judgment. Koriat et al. ( 1980) and 
Hoch (1984) reported that explanation/counterexplanation affect confidence judgments. The 
results show that confidence revision has a significant on beliefrevision (F = 5.93, p = .016). 
[Insert Tab le 2 here] 
predicts an interaction between initial judgment and 
explanation/counterexplanation. Specifically, it states that auditors who counterexplain an 
inaccurate judgment will make more positive belief revision compared to auditors who 
explain an inaccurate judgment. In addition, auditors who counterexplain an accurate 
judgment will make more negative belief revision compared to auditors who explain an 
accurate judgment. The results are shown in Table 2. As expected, the initial judgment had a 
significant effect on belief revision (F = 5.50, p = .021). There were no significant main 
effects for groups/individuals and explanation/counterexplanation. No significant two-way 
interaction effects on belief revision were observed between initiai judgment and 
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groups/individuals (F = 1.85, p > .1), and between groups/individuals and 
explanation/counterexplanation (F < 1, p > .1 ). There was a significant two-way interaction 
effect between initial judgment and explanation/counterexplanation (F 8.98, p = .003). Panel 
A, Table 3 shows the means (SDs) and Figure l shows the interaction effect. When required 
to counterexplain an inaccurate judgment, participants increased their accuracy by 0.66 
( l .25), while those who explain an inaccurate judgment increased their accuracy by 0.20 
( 1.08). Planned comparisons showed this difference to be significant (t = 1.66, p = .05 [one-
tailed]). 
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 here] 
When a counterexplanation was provided for -..an accurate··judgment, accuracy 
decreased by -0.31 (0.96), while explaining an accurate judgment resulted in an increase in 
accuracy of 0.22 (0.68). Planned comparisons showed this difference to be significant (t = -
2.65, p = .005 [one-tailed]). Participants who counterexplain an accurate judgment made 
significantly more negative belief revision compared to participants who explain an accurate 
judgment. These results support H1• 
Panel B, Table 3 shows the initial judgment of both accurate and inaccurate auditors. 
The mean score for the inaccurate auditors is less than five (the mid-point) whereas the mean 
score for the accurate auditors is greater than 5. After counterexplaining an inaccurate 
judgment, the mean score did not shift up to the mid-point so that the average judgment was 
still inaccurate. Similarly, after counterexplaining an accurate judgment, the negative belief 
revision did not take the mean score below 5. That is, average accuracy was not affected. In 
order to understand this further, the specific judgments were examined next. When required 
to counterexplain an inaccurate judgment, ten (29%) participants out of 34 adjusted their 
judgment up to or passed the mid-point. In contrast, four (11 %) participants out of 37 
adjusted their accuracy score up to or passed the midpoint when they were required to explain 
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an inaccurate judgment. The difference between these two changes was marginally significant 
., 
(X- = 2.61, p = .05 3 [ one-tailed]). Three (9%) participants out of 34 reduced the accuracy 
score below the midpoint when they counterexplain an accurate judgment. However, none of 
the 34 participants who explain an accurate judgment reduced their accuracy score below 5. 
The difference between these revisions was similarly significant (X2 = 2.78, p = .048 [one-
tailed]). These results provide further support for Hi. 
Following this, the dichotomous judgment was analyzed. When required to 
counterexplain, five ( 12%) out of 43 auditors switched from an inaccurate judgment to an 
accurate judgment. Two (5%) out of 41 auditors who explain an inaccurate judgment 
switched to an accurate judgment. The difference between these changes was not significant 
(X2 = 1.56, p = .105 [ one-tailed]). Those who counterexplain an accurate judgment (n = 25) 
did not change their judgment. Similarly, those who explain an accurate judgment (n = 30) 
did not alter their judgment. These results do not support Hi. 
H2 predicts that audit groups will mitigate the negative effects of counterexplaining 
accurate judgments and enhance the positive effects of counterexplaining inaccurate 
judgments. The results in Table 2 shows an insignificant three-way interaction effect between 
explaining/counterexplaining, initial judgment and groups/individuals (F = 1.03, p > .1). To 
further test H2, analyses using the dichotomized judgment were examined next. Two ( 17%) 
out of 12 inaccurate groups made an accurate judgment after counterexplaining whereas none 
of the individual auditors (n = 31) changed their inaccurate judgment. These changes were 
significant (X2 = 5.42, p = .010 [one-tailed]). However, neither audit groups (n = 18) nor 
individual auditors (n = 7) changed their accurate judgment for an inaccurate one when they 
were required to counterexplain. Audit groups did not appear to reduce the negative effects of 
counterexplaining and they enhanced the positive effects of counterexplaining by very little. 
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DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the effects of audit groups and counterexplanation on fraud 
detection. The purpose of such an examination is to determine whether counterexplanation 
improves fraud detection. An experiment that manipulated audit groups/individual auditors, 
initial judgment and two explanation types was carried out. Participants were required to 
evaluate an inventory balance that contained material misstatements by management. The 
judgment on the fair presentation of the inventory balance was made twice with an 
intervening explanation or counterexplanation. The purpose of this manipulation is to 
examine the positive and negative aspects of counterexplanation by examining belief 
revision. 
This study predicts a two-way interaction effect between initial judgment and type of 
explanation on belief revision. Specifically, it predicts that counterexplaining an inaccurate 
judgment will lead to a more positive belief revision compared to explaining an inaccurate 
judgment. It also predicts that counterexplaining an accurate judgment will lead to more 
negative belief revision compared to explaining an accurate judgment. The results (using a 
continuous scale) showed this to be so. Participants who counterexplain an inaccurate 
judgment made more positive belief revision compared to those who explain an inaccurate 
judgment. However, participants who counterexplain an accurate judgment made more 
negative belief revision than those who explain an inaccurate judgment. In spite of this, the 
results on Table 3 show that these belief revisions are rather small. The belief revisions did 
not cause the average accuracy score to cross the mid-point (5). When the specific scores 
were examined, counterexplanation did cause more inaccurate participants (both groups and 
individuals) to adjust their accuracy score up to or beyond the mid-point than accurate 
participants did. It caused significantly more accurate participants to adjust their accuracy 
score below the mid-point compared to accurate participants who explain. Results using the 
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dichotomous scale, however, reported no significant difference between the effects of 
explanation and counterexplanation and initial judgment on belief revision. 
Translated to fraud detection, counterexplanation did cause some auditors to detect 
fraud. It also caused some auditors who detected fraud to abandon their initial hypothesis. 
Given the serious implications of fraud detection, these results have some implications for 
audit management. Notwithstanding that these results are not as strong as predicted, they do 
provide evidence on both the positive and negative aspects of counterexplanation. They 
suggest that in some situations, the use of counterexplanation may be justifiable and that in 
others, care should be exercised in requiring a counterexplanation. For example, it may be 
advantageously used on auditors who have a history of making inaccurate judgments. 
However, it should be cautiously used on auditors who have consistently made accurate 
judgments. 
Confidence revision (used as a covariate) had a significant effect on belief revision. 
This is consistent with prior literature which finds that auditors tend to be under-confident. 
The psychology literature suggests that counterexplanation works by moderating over-
confidence (Koriat et al. 1980). It works on inaccurate auditors by requiring them to 
reconsider opposing argument and thereby reducing their confidence. Unfortunately, it has 
similarly effects on accurate auditors. This study showed that while it may be effective on 
those who did not detect the fraud, it was counter-productive on those who did (for both audit 
groups and individual auditors). Not all audit superiors have a record of their audit 
subordinates' prior judgments. For example, the subordinate may be new to the firm or the 
subordinate may not have worked with a particular superior. In such cases, 
counterexplanation should ~e sparingly prescribed. As this is the first study which found 
counterexplanation to be counter-productive, more research would have to be conducted 
before definite conclusions could be drawn. 
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When belief revision caused by counterexplaining accurate and inaccurate judgments 
is compared between audit groups and individual auditors, our hypothesis that audit groups 
could counterexplain inaccurate judgments more effectively than individual auditors was only 
supported when the dichotomous judgment was analyzed. However, in counterexplaining 
accurate judgments, both audit groups and individual auditors did not change their accurate 
judgment after counterexplaining. These results provide only limited evidence that there may 
be advantageous in counterexplaining by groups, and that counterexplaining by groups leads 
to higher fraud detection rates. An explanation for this insignificant result may be due to the 
fact that the initial judgment of the groups had already been adjusted to take into account 
opposing arguments. When asked to counterexplain subsequently, they did not significantly 
alter their judgment. Evidence of this is provided in the results. The groups' initial judgment 
. . 
was significantly more accurate compared to the individuals' [means were 5.54 (sd 2.02) 
(groups), and, 4.26 (sd 7.97) (individuals)] (t = 3.78, p = .000). 
This study makes use of participants that are relatively inexperienced auditors. An 
interesting extension of this study would be to examine the effects of audit groups and 
counterexplanation on more experienced auditors. Future studies could also examine the 
effects of these two variables on other audit tasks. 
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Appendix A 
The Client: Tucker House Ltd 
Tucker House Ltd operates a chain of fast food restaurants. The company began in 199 l and by the 
end of 1996 had grown to 41 units, located primarily in the eastern states. Tucker House uses a 
financial accounting year end of 31 October. 
Restaurants 
The atmosphere of the restaurants is similar to most fast food restaurants, attractive, bright and clean. 
All of the restaurants open 7 days a week for lunch and dinner. The busier restaurants open for 
breakfast as well. The menu is more up-market than most hamburger outlets serving steak 
sandwiches, beef burgers, selected chicken items, and the usual drinks and desserts. 
Operational control has been maintained through a computerized information system. Each 
restaurant is equipped with specially designed computerised cash registers that have the menu items 
incorporated on them. This system is used to compute on a daily, weekly and monthly basis, 
separately for each of the restaurant units, profit and loss, sales and cost breakdown by product, 
labour productivity, payroll and variations from budget. 
The Purchasing and Warehousing Division 
The company operates its own purchasing and warehousing division· (PWD) from which all the 
restaurants are supplied with portion-controlled units of meat, poultry and other food items, as well as 
paper and other supplies. 
The PWD includes meat cutting rooms, refrigeration and freezer storage space. The PWD processes 
much of the meat required by the restaurants and makes all the sauces and dressings. The company 
purchases other items in large quantities in anticipation of seasonal price fluctuations. 
The effort to control meat cost is the most important area of cost control at Tucker House. Meat 
represents 80% of food costs, or almost 33% of sales, and management feels that one of the keys to 
Tucker House's success is the PWD which makes it possible for Tucker House to cope with changes 
in the prices of meat. 
The Account: Inventory at financial year end 31.10.96 
Type of Inventory 
Meat 
Other (non-meat) food/beverages 
Total food/beverages 
Supplies 
Others 
Total: All inventory 
Instructions 
i 
2,615,546 
335,620 
2,951,166 
266,942 
269,286 
3,487,394 
Percentage of Total 
75.0% 
10.0% 
85.0% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
100.0% 
In order for you to perform an audit of Tucker House's inventory balance, the following information 
items are available. You should only evaluate those information items you consider are necessary for 
forming an opinion on whether or not the inventory balance is fairly stated. 
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
Information about Tucker House Directors, Management and Employees .............................. pg 4 
l. Key management personnel 
2. Members of the Board of Directors 
3. Board structure and number of meetings 
4. Board members comments regarding managing director and financial director 
Other Information about Tucker House ....................................................................................... pg 6 
5. Menu prices for main meals, 1994-96; average bill per customer 
6. Main meal sales by type (percentages) 
7. Number of restaurant units in operation, 1994-96 
8. Expansion costs and plans 
9. History of share offerings and debt financing 
10. Management forecast of 1996 sales/earnings 
Inventory and Inventory-related Financial Report Data/Ratios ................................................ pg 8 
l l. Weighted average annual sales per restaurant unit, 1994-96 
12. Cost of Sales as a percentage of Sales, 1994-96 
13. Cost of Sales percentage breakdown (food/beverages vs. labour), 1994-96 
14. Total purchases of food and beverages, 1994-96 
15. Total inventories($), 1994-96 
16. Inventory turnover and number of days sales in ending inventory, 1994-96 
17. Inventory location (Restaurants vs PWD), 1995-96 · 
18. Percentage breakdown of inventory by type, 1994-96 
19. Percentage breakdown of meat inventory by type, 1996 
20. Purchase commitments($) for meat at financial year end, 1994-96 
Other Financial Report Information ........................................................................................... pg 11 
21. Current assets, by type, as a percentage of total assets, 1994-96 
22. Current liabilities, by type, as a percentage of total liabilities and shareholders equity, 1994-
96 
23. Gross sales, 1994-96 
24. Net income as a percentage of Sales, 1994-96 
Financial Ratios (Other than inventory-related) ....................................................................... pg 12 
25. Current ratio and Quick ratio, 1994-96 
26. Receivables turnover & Number of days sales in ending accounts receivables, 1994-96 
27. Earnings per share, 1994-96 
28. Price-Earnings ratio, 1994-96 
Results of 1996 Audit Procedures ................................................................................................ pg 13 
29. Results of physical inventory observation at restaurants 
30. How restaurant test units for inventory observation were chosen 
31. Results of analytical comparisons/reviews for unobserved restaurants 
32. Results of physical inventory observation at PWD 
33. Results of inventory pricing tests 
34. Results of inventory cutoff tests 
35. Audit procedures performed related to purchase commitments 
36. 1996 Management Letter comments re internal control weaknesses 
37. Evaluation of effectiveness of Internal Audit function 
38 1996 Solicitor's Letter 
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Inventory Policies/Background and Selected Client Records ................................................... pg 18 
39. PWD history (size, expansions) - 1992-96 
40. Beef processing and purchasing policies 
41. Accounting records/internal controls for PWD inventory 
42. Sources (vendors) for food, beverage and supply purchases 
43. Client records: Receiving Log, Week 52, FY 96 
44. Client records: Receiving Log, Week l, FY 97 
45. Client records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 51, FY 96 
46. Client records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 52, FY 96 
47. Client records: Physical Inventory Counts, 3 largest items, FY 95 
48. Client records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week l, FY 97 
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Table 1 · Experiment Design 
ExJ!lanation T!J!e* 
Explanation Counter- Total 
Groups/Individuals Initial Judgment explanation 
Groups Inaccurate 13 11 24 
Accurate 21 19 40 
Individuals Inaccurate 24 23 47 
Accurate 13 15 28 
Total 71 68 139 
*Numbers indicate cell size. 
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Table 2 - Initial Judgment and Exelanation/Counterexelanation on Belief Revision 
ANCOVA Results 
Source of Variation MS· df F p* 
Covariates: 
Audit experience .078 1 .077 ns 
Confidence revision 5.986 1 5.932 .016 
Main effects: 
Initial judgment (J) 5.548 1 5.498 .021 
Explanation/counterexplanation (C) .358 1 .355 ns 
Groups/individuals (G) 1.863 1 .197 ns 
Two-way interactions: 
JxG 1.863 1 1.846 ns 
J xC 9.060 1 8.978 .003 
CxG .023 1 .025 ns 
Three-way interaction: 
J xCxG 1.037 1.028 ns 
R = 16%, Adjusted R = 10% 
* ns = not significant 
25 
Panel A - Belief Revision 
Variations: 
Counterexplanation 
Explanation 
Panel B - Accuracy Score 
Variations: 
Counterexplanation 
Explanation 
Table 3 - Means (SDs) 
Initial Judgment 
Inaccurate Accurate 
0.66 
( 1.25) 
0.20 
(1.08) 
-0.31 
(0.96) 
0.22 
(0.68) 
Initial Judgment* 
Inaccurate 
3.19 
(0.64) 
. ,, 2.77 
(0.85) 
Accurate 
6.72 
(0.93) 
6.99 
(0.78) 
*The accuracy scale was anchored by "fairly presented" (l) and "not fairly presented" (9). 
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Figure 1 
Interaction Effect between Initial Judgment and Explanation/Counterexplanation 
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Endnotes: 
I Counterexplanation has been shown to result in higher belief revision (Koonce 1992; Heiman 1990); debias 
the curse of knowledge (the curse of knowledge is the inability of people to ignore their own knowledge 
when making predictions about other people's knowledge) (Kennedy 1995), and reduce the effects of 
confirmation bias (Church 1991 ). 
2. Koonce ( 1992) required her participants to consider opposing arguments prior to judging whereas Koriat et 
al. ( 1980) and Heiman ( 1990) required participants to counterexplain subsequent to judging. 
Explanation effect is the tendency of decision-makers to make decisions consistent with their explanation. 
4 Belief perseverance is the tendency of decision makers to adhere to certain beliefs even after the information 
that formed these beliefs were discredited. 
Causal explanation is the bridge decision-makers build between the information and the judgment. 
6 The data were collected from particpants at a national training course and the course convenor had allowed 
an hour for the experiment. Pincus's participants took about an hour to complete the task. Since this 
experiment required participants to perform more tasks, we had to reduce the number of information items 
so that the participants could complete the task in the time alloted. On average, particiapants took about 55 
minutes to complete the tasks. 
7 One group and three individuals did not complete the experiment, this resulted in 64 (groups) and 75 
(individuals) useable responses. There were two groups of two participants. 
8 All participants were required to record the amount of effort they expended on the task and their motivation 
to provide answers they could justify on nine-point Likert-type scales. The effort expended scale was 
anchored by "very little effort" (I) and "a great deal of·effort" (9). The mean scores are 5.98 (groups) and 
5.82 (individuals). These scores are not significantly different (F = .54, p = .46) and show that participants 
in both groups and individuals conditions expended reasonable amounts of effort. The motivation scale was 
anchored by "not at all motivated" (I) and "a great deal of motivation" (9). The mean scores are 6.34 
(groups) and 6.18 (individuals), and are not significantly different (F = .53, p = .47). These scores show that 
participants were reasonably motivated to provide answers they felt they could justify. 
To test the success of the group manipulation, participants in the group condition were required to rate their 
satisfaction with their group's judgments on a seven-point Likert-type scale where one indicated 
dissatisfaction and seven indicated satisfaction. The mean satisfaction score is 5.48 (sd - 1.14). In addition, 
participants in the group condition were also required to rate the amount of interaction in their group on a 
nine-point Likert-type scale anchored by "no interaction at all" (1) and "a lot of interaction" (9). The mean 
score is 6.50 (sd 1.26). Both these scores show that the group manipulation was successful. 
9 Dichotomizing the data set using the median (4) and the mean (4.85) yielded similar results, and this applied 
to all tests of significance using the dichotomized data as no participant made judgments of between 4 to 5. 
10 The initial judgment of inaccurate participants who explain and counterexplain showed a significant 
difference (t = 2.42, p .018) while the initial judgment of accurate participants in the explanation and 
counterexplanation conditions were not significantly different (t = 1.31, p = .193). This potential problem 
was overcome by examining participants' belief revision. 
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